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ABSTRACT
Watchful Waiting: U.S. Neutrality Law in the Atlantic World: 1815-1819.
This paper addressed the ways in which American statesmen responded to
the diplomatic crisis of American citizens serving as privateers for the
rebelling countries of South America during the South American Wars for
Independence. Most specifically, this paper analyzes the strategy of
President James Monroe, who crafted a elastic and flexible policy of
“watchful waiting,” which allowed the state to capitalize on events and
situations in U.S. favor without bringing the nation into war with Spain. From
a position of international weakness, U.S. statesmen were able to take
advantage of the crisis caused by American privateers and, in the process,
strengthen the state economically and territorially.

Money Bags and Cannon Balls: The First Bribery War and the Expansion of
American Presidential Power
This paper analyzes the expansion of presidential power witnessed during
the Thomas Jefferson administration during the First Barbary War of 18011805. During the Early Republic, American shipping faced piratical actions
from the various Regencies of the Barbary Coast, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis
and Tripoli. Jefferson sought to break from the noncombative precedent of
his Federalist predecessors by directly engaging the Barbary corsairs. In
taking the fight to the Mediterranean, Jefferson transformed the role of the
executive. The demands of war forced Jefferson to empower the
presidential role of commander in chief in unprecedented and long-lasting
ways.
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Chapter 1: Intellectual Bibliography

During the 2017-2018 academic year, I worked to complete the necessary
coursework needed to earn a Master’s Degree in American History at the College of
William and Mary. In addition to a course on the Historian’s Craft, and three reading
classes covering topics such as Southern History, Vast Early America, and Early Native
American History, the major element of my degree works consists two thesis written in
the Fall 2017 and Spring 2018. These projects, roughly between 20-30 pages each,
represent research conducted in American foreign affairs during the Early Republic.
Although I came to William and Mary with no previous scholarly training at the graduate
level, these papers have provided me the opportunity to make modest contributions to
the historical narrative surrounding early 19th century American diplomacy.
I came to William and Mary with a strong desire to professionalize my passion for
history. For the previous four years before enrolling in the graduate history program, I
taught American History at a private all-male boarding school in foothills of Virginia’s
Blue Ridge Mountains. Teaching is my life’s passion, and this drive to become the best
educator possible inspired me earn my Master’s Degree in history at William and Mary.
My teaching background greatly influenced my time at William and Mary. As a
teacher, it is my goal to make history as enlightening, fun, and illuminating as possible
for my future students. Therefore, both the classes I chose as my reading seminars and
the topics studied for my research portfolio were inspired by my desire to make my
experience at William and Mary as practical as possible for my career. Thus, I chose
classes and topics that corresponded with subjects I will teach in the future and
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research topics that would exciting to teach high schoolers who might think history a
boring subject. Whereas many of my classmates came into this academic year with a
clear sense of what kind of historian they sought to be, I came in as a generalist who
sought stories and topics that I would be able to make exciting for my future high school
students.
Thus, lacking an identity as a specific type of historian, I was free to choose a
topic within the Atlantic World theme that most excited me. Wanting to stay in American
history and thinking that pirates were fascinating, I began to investigate American
pirates in the Atlantic World. Thanks to Professor Prado’s help, I found that American
privateers greatly impacted the direction of U.S. foreign policy after the War of 1812. In
a paper entitled “Watchful Waiting: U.S. Neutrality Law in the Atlantic World: 18151819.” I investigated the role American privateers operating during the Age of
Revolution played in dictating U.S. neutrality laws after the War of 1812. These
privateers, hired by South American revolutionaries to harass Spanish maritime forces,
threaten America’s fragile peace with Spain. My main observation in this paper was
that, in the hands of skilled American diplomats, U.S. neutrality was situated on a sliding
scale. These American statesmen pursued expansionist policies that pushed right up
against neutrality in ways that empowered the state while at the same time avoided war
with Spain. Thus, what began as a very general interest in pirates transformed into an
investigation into the changing dynamics of U.S. neutrality law during the Early
Republic. No doubt my students will someday benefit from my work analyzing the role
swashbuckling American pirates-for-hire played in facilitating expansionist U.S. policies
after 1812.

2

Due to my experience looking into the maritime aspects of U.S overseas policy,
during the Spring semester in Professor Middleton’s Colonial America class, I continued
to investigate American foreign policy during the Early Republic. The topic I eventually
chose is not a direct relation to my Fall paper, however, there are some similarities. This
Spring, I looked into American foreign policy as seen through the Barbary War of 18011805. This topic began with an interest in the military actions of this understudied U.S.
engagement, but it later matured into a paper about Thomas Jefferson’s evolving
character as Commander in Chief. This paper was called “Money Bag and Cannon
Balls: The First Bribery War and the Expansion of American Presidential Power.”
Condensing Jefferson’s ideological complexities into a coherent thesis statement
represented a challenge this semester, as I am concerned that my argument was not as
tight as it could have been. Nevertheless, I was pleased in my attempt to illustrate that
change Jefferson underwent as America’s first wartime leader. After the loss of the
300+ man crew of the USS Philadelphia to Tripoli, Jefferson took on policies and tactics
that challenged his republican ideology. Within this paper, one of my main realizations
was the fact that Jefferson pursued Republican-inspired foreign policy objectives
through Federalist-inspired means. In order to achieve victory in North Africa, Jefferson
expanded the power of the presidency far beyond that of his Federalist predecessors.
I did not intend to write two papers about American foreign policy post 1800. My
primary area of interest in American History revolves around the Gilded Age and Cold
War. However, this year, William and Mary’s course list this academic year was
thematically limited by classes that primarily addressed topics regarding early American
history. Thus, although I view myself as a generalist, my one year at William and Mary

3

did allow me to pursue topics that truly engaged my favorite areas of history. In both the
Fall and Spring semesters, I found topics that examined America’s role in the world from
positions of international weakenss. As I am not interested in perusing my academic
career into the Ph.D level, I do not intend on publishing either of these papers. As being
the best secondary teacher that I can be is my primary concern, having these papers
published is not a concern of mine. That being said, writing these papers has been a
tremendous learning experience for me. Not only have I honed my skill as a writer and
researcher, but I have also regained some sympathy for my future students who will
have to write the papers I assign them. Thanks to graduate school, I will be better
equipped to both guide them and sympathize with them.

4

Chapter 2 - Watchful Waiting: U.S. Neutrality Law in the Atlantic World: 1815-1819.
David Curtis DeForest must have chuckled quietly to himself as he read the
morning newspaper in his New Haven home. It was December 3rd, 1823, and the
Atlantic World was waking up to the news of President James Monroe’s “declaration”
the previous day.1 For almost two decades, DeForest was an adventure-capitalist in
Buenos Aires, a duel merchant-diplomat career created in the political chaos of the
South American Wars of Independence that began in 1810.2 After cutting his teeth
learning how to do business “the smuggling way” in Brazil, DeForest made Buenos
Aires his adopted home.3 He amassed such a fortune from his extralegal activities that
he was able to retire in 1818, and move back to his native home in New Haven,
Connecticut. As DeForest read the words of what will become known as the Monroe
Doctrine, it is not hard to imagine that memories of his own role in the creation of the
doctrine rushed warmly into his mind. Now, an old man at 51, the “Don” read that
Monroe was formally closing a period of free-wheeling reactionary politics that had
allowed merchants and privateers alike to prosper.4 Snuggled warmly in the New
James Monroe, The Monroe Doctrine,” Address, December 2, 1823. Quoted in, James P.
Lucier. The Political Writings of James Monroe. Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2001. 637.
2
Historians and scholars of 19th century South America do not agree on what to call this period of
revolutionary activity against Spain. From 1810 to 1825, South Americans fought to gain their
impendence. The many different leaders, states, goals, and outcomes associated with Latin American
independent movement makes it difficult to characterize in broad terms this vast and diverse revolutionary
age. In light of this difficulty, I will use the term “South American Wars for Impendence” to refer to the
collective struggle for Latin American independence. Although impendence movements arose from
Mexico to Argentina, this paper focuses on the South American republics, as their struggle tested U.S.
neutrality the most.
3
Benjamin Keen. David Curtis DeForest and the Revolution of Buenos Aires. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1947. 15.
4
I will use the term “privateer” to refer to American sailors who were officially contracted by South
American revolutionary government to raid and disrupt Spanish imperial vessels. These privateers
operated under government sanctioned letter of marque, that legitimized their activities on the high seas.
Any bounty or money gained by these actions were to be distributed in prize courts operated in both
North and South American ports. The contract-relationship aspect of privateering is one of the major
differences separating these sailors-for-hire from the more lawless pirate, who acted without the consent
of any government. Head, “New Nations, New Connections,”164-5.
1
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England mansion paid for by profits earned through his South American exploits,
DeForest no doubt read Monroe’s doctrine as the official end to a dangerous and
unstable diplomatic era he had helped to create and exploit.5
Historians of 19th century America have often portrayed the1823 Monroe
Doctrine as a great beginning, a “diplomatic declaration of independence” that
unshackled the United States from European control.6 Henry Cabot Lodge, speaking in
1883, proclaimed that “the Monroe Doctrine bore witness to the strong foreign policy of
an independent people.”7 What the Monroe Doctrine did, was in 954 words, tell
Europe’s imperial governments that any future attempts to colonize the Western
Hemisphere would be considered by the United States of America as a danger to
America’s “peace and safety.”8 Thanks to hindsight, it is not difficult to see this bold
proclamation to Europe by a minor regional power as the foundational step in the United
States’ rise to global superpower. Most of all, because it worked. After 1823, the major
powers of Europe, England, France and Spain did not attempt to colonize the American
continents. They did not deter the continued liberalization of free trade. Finally, they did
not stop American expansion.9
However, to see the Monroe Doctrine solely through the lens of American
exceptionalism, blurs the important context in which it was created. The U.S. during the
Early Republic was still a minor military power with little less than a coast guard for a
navy and no large standing army to speak off.10 In the four decades since declaring

5

Keen, 166-8.
Jay sexton. The Monroe Doctrine. New York: Hill and Wang Publishing, 2011. 54.
7
Henry Cabot Lodge, quoted in, Sexton 53.
8
Monroe, “The Monroe Doctrine.” Lucier, 638.
9
Sexton, 56.
10
Stephen M. Chambers. No God but Gain: The Untold Story of Cuban Slavery, the Monroe
Doctrine, and the Making of the United States. New York: Verso Publishing, 2015. 16.
6

6

independence, the U.S. had been invaded twice by England, had its capital burn, and
got involved in an undeclared naval war with France. American foreign policy since its
founding had been largely reactionary, acting off of and responding to the interventionist
politics that characterized European diplomacy. Born out of the transatlantic Wars for
South American Independence, the Monroe Doctrine was an attempt by American
statesmen to end the instability that had threatened their policy making. Therefore,
rather than seeing the Monroe Doctrine as the beginning of American power, the
Monroe Doctrine was actually created to end an era of Atlantic World volatility,
detrimental to U.S. state building during the Early Republic. Influenced by both fear of
European interventionism and hopeful nationalistic opportunism, James Monroe and his
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, penned a proactive and anticolonial doctrine
that not only helped stabilized transatlantic relations but also ended the threat of war
that had been a defining feature influencing U.S. policy since 1776.11 Monroe, Adams,
and their doctrine thus represented a culminating achievement for their view of
republican state building after the War of 1812.
However, if the 1823 doctrine was the climax, then how did American leaders,
who did not share a united vision for state-building, arrive at such a grand and impactful
consensus? Such a strong statement was actually the result of an influential period of
weakness. From 1815, when peace returned after the War of 1812, to the establishment
of the Transcontinental Treaty in 1819, American leaders faced very real threats of war
in their efforts to accomplish various economic and territorial goals. With the return of
peace, expansionist politicians wanted to take advantage of the political and economic

11

Sexton, 55.
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chaos created by the South American Wars for Independence by deepening American
commercial interests in Latin American while at the same time acquiring land from
Spanish Florida.12 War, however, would ruin the plans men like Monroe, Adams, and
Henry Clay had for the nation’s future strength and security.13 Thus, the period between
1815 and 1819 represented a dangerous and unstable time when U.S. political elites
made conscious efforts to strengthen and protect the still nascent American state.14 In
claiming neutrality, American statesmen were creating a self-serving balance between
direct action and noninterventionism that allowed the state to achieve valuable
economic and diplomatic goals. Embedded in this unique style of American neutrality
was a strategic flexibility that allowed policy elites to safely maneuver a chaotic Atlantic
environment filled with the threat of war.15 As the U.S. sought recovery and peace after
the War of 1812, Monroe and Adams used a flexible and sometimes contradictory
neutrality law to define and strengthen the American state in the Early Republic.
Historians’ interest in American interactions in the Atlantic first peaked in the
World War Era. Given the U.S.’s own neutral proclamations during the 1910s and
1940s, it is not surprising that historians were deeply considering and writing about a
time in America’s past when geopolitics threatened the state’s neutrality. The first
historian to define America’s relationship with South America was Charles Lyon
Chambers. Chambers, a Harvard professor who studied in South America. In 1917, he

12

Charles Carrol Griffin . The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 18101822. New York: Columbia University Press, 1937. 143.
13
John Quincy Adams, diary entry, January 19, 1818. The Memoirs of John Quincy Adams: His
Diary from 1795 to 1848, edited by Adams, Charles Francis. Vol. Vol. 4. New York: Books for Library
Press, 1874. 43.
14
Gary Hart. James Monroe. New York: Times Books. 2005. 77-79.
15
The Neutrality Act of 1794 would be the first time a government codified the exact obligations
and duties of a neutral nation. American neutrality would also be unique in that it attached strict penalties
to violators, thus connecting neutrality to the criminal code of the United States.
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wrote Inter-American Acquaintances, the text that began American’s scholarly interest
in the Atlantic South. Written in 1941, Arthur K. Whitaker’s 612-page tome, U.S. and the
Independence of Latin America 1800-1830, quickly became a foundational work in the
theme of American-South American studies. Whitaker acknowledges the similarity
between America in the 1820s and the 1940s, and claims that when discussing the
broad themes of the era, one could substitute “’totalitarianism’ for ‘monarchical’ and
‘democracy’ for ‘republicanism.’”16 Given this dire geopolitical environment in which he
was writing, Whitaker’s expansive study highlights in moral terms America’s leading role
in transatlantic relations.
Historians in the war years were actively thinking about America’s neutral
position in the Atlantic World, and their various works reflect the politics of the day. One
of the earliest attempts to chronical the development of American neutrality laws was
written in 1913 by Charles Fenwick. The Neutrality Laws of the United States takes an
academic approach at conceptualizing what was and was not America’s role as a
neutral nation throughout its history. Another approach taken by these early historians
was to conceptualize America as taking a leading role in South American affairs. “PanAmericanism” is the subject of Laura Bornholdt’s Baltimore and Early Pan-Americanism.
Written in 1949, Bornholdt’s analysis of America leading a coalition of American states
was likely influenced by the formation of NATO that same year. Charles Carrol Griffin’s
1937 text, The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 1810-1822 is
emblematic of the general approach taken by historians at that time. Griffin’s focuses on
the power politics of the nation-state, lumping all policies and attitudes under the broad

16

Arthur P. Whitaker. The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1941. Vii.
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national characters of “the United States, Spain, and Spanish America.”17 Later
historians will give more agency to the individuals who actually did the 19th century
politicking.
In recent years, scholars have reengaged this area of study. Responding to
Benedict Anderson’s reconceptualization of nationalism, current scholarship takes a
much closer look at the various identities and cross-cultural interactions represented in
the history of America-in-the-Atlantic. Emblematic of this approach is Caitlin Fitz’s 2016
work, Our Sister Republics. In her book, Fitz expertly chronicles the rise and fall of
American public opinion towards the South American independence movement through
U.S. media coverage of revolutionary leaders like Simón Bolívar.18 Americans who
toasted patriot victories and named their babies Bolívar were projecting their own
republican ideology onto the South American struggle, and in doing so, refined their
own sense of American republicanism. Along these same lines, historian Matthew
Karp’s work, This Vast Southern Empire, analyzes the impact South American relations
had in the creation of a separate brand of Southern politics. Karp argues that few
Americans in the 19th century were more in tune with geopolitics than Southern
politicians, and that the South had an oversized role in shaping the nature and direction
of American foreign policy.19 Thus, given the South’s strong grip on federal positions of
power, Southern statesmen were able to create a U.S. nationalism that was not only
benevolent to domestic slavery but also protective of the foreign slavery in the Atlantic.20

17

Griffin, 5.
Caitlin Fitz. Our Sister Republics: The United States in an Age of American Revolutions. New
York: Liverlight Publishing Corporation, 2016. 9-11.
19
Matthew Karp. This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign
Policy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016, 3.
20
Karp, 5.
18
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The other direction recent historians have taken in the field of America-in-theAtlantic is to stress the growth of American state power in transnationalist terms.
Stephan Chambers’ No God but Gain, highlights the role “the generation of 1815”
played in connecting American future success to the Cuban slave trade.21 By separating
the statesmen from their Founding predecessors, Chambers argues that the “15ers”
used the lucrative Cuban slave trade fuel the creation of their new brand of American
nationalism, one that relied on transatlantic commercial connections.22 Historian David
Head shows this transnationalist influence in a different light, highlighting the role
individuals played in connecting Atlantic communities. In Privateers of the Americas,
Head argues that studying privateers allows a much clearer view of how the U.S.
interacted in a rapidly dissolving imperial Atlantic community. Whereas many historians
leave out the smaller actors in favor of aggrandizing the elite policymakers, Head shows
that these diverse privateers not only had agency but also impacted the direction of
Atlantic History. In this way, Head hopes to use the aggressive individualism of
privateers to bridge the gap between historians of the Atlantic World and the
Americanists of the Early Republic period.23 Head, as well as Chambers, have helped to
move American Atlantic studies into the Caribbean, and they have made great
contributions looking at the impact trade with that region had on domestic politics and
American foreign policy.
These works represent the significant scholarship being done in the expanding
field of America-in-the-Atlantic. Though all different in their focus, these historians all

21

Chambers, 3.
Chambers, 5-6.
23
David Head. Privateers of the Americas: Spanish American Privateering from the United States
in the Early Republic. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015. 5-8.
22
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engage the diverse factors responsible for creating national identities in the Early
Republic. This paper will continue the historiographical themes expressed in the current
literature by positioning the years 1815-1819 as a moment of state building intentionally
designed by a small cohort of the American political elite. Far from unified in their end
goals, these statesmen sought to use America’s neutral status as a means to achieve
substantial goals in the areas of trade and territory. The factors aiding and inhibiting the
achievement of these strategic aims will occupy this paper’s focus. Past and current
historians have largely overlooked the role neutrality law played in U.S. state-building.
While many do engage neutrality as factor in post 1812 Atlantic, scholars talk of the old
1794 Neutrality Law and its 1818 revision as minor steps that help lead to the eventual
big policy event of the Monroe Doctrine. On the other hand, much ink has been spent
analyzing the significance of the Monroe Doctrine as its impact on U.S. history. Yet,
looking only at the big events obscures the significant context that allowed such bold
declaration to be made in 1823 by a minor Atlantic power. By focusing on the role
neutrality law played in a time of great fragility and uncertainty, this paper will reposition
neutrality as a significant and central tool in the hands of skilled policymakers.
Therefore, by centralizing the role these laws played, this paper will illustrate how, from
a position of international weakness, U.S. presidents and statesmen leveraged a
contradictory and flexible neutrality law to not only avoid war but also secure the
expansion of U.S. trade and territory.
*

*

*

*

*

In 1792, Europe exploded into revolutionary war. Responding to the French
Revolution, the monarchal powers across Europe summoned their armies to challenge

12

this threat.24 Across the Atlantic, the young United States of America watched Europe
burn with growing unrest. Having recently secured independence in 1783, the warweary nation could not afford to fight in another European war. In response to this
existential threat, President George Washington addressed the Congressional elite in
1793, informing them that it was now “the duty and interest of the United States . . . to
sincerely and with good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial towards
the belligerent powers.”25 To help protect his newborn country, Washington envisioned
a hand off approach to foreign policy. Washington believed that the U.S. should honor
“with perfect good faith” all foreign commercial relationships, but avoid permanent
alliances with European nations, as “a passionate attachment of one Nation for another”
could lead to either unnecessary war or disadvantages in future treaty negotiations.26 As
his second and final term as president came to a close in 1796, Washington penned a
parting letter to the American people that would greatly impact the direction and
character of American foreign relations for the next century.27 In what would be known
as his “Farewell Address,” Washington elaborated on his ideas about a neutral foreign
policy, stating that “the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations, is, in
extending our commercial relations, to have with [Europe] as little political connections
as possible . . . hence, therefore it is unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial
ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collision

24

Charles S. Hyneman "Neutrality during the European Wars of 1792-1815: America's
Understanding of Her Obligations." The American Journal of International Law Vol 24., No. 2 (April 1930):
279-309. 297.
25
George Washington Congressional Address, April 22, 1793. Quoted in Charles G Fenwick. The
Neutrality Laws of the United States. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment Publishing, 1913. 17.
26
Ferrell. 89.
27
Charles G Fenwick. The Neutrality Laws of the United States. Washington D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment Publishing, 1913. 16.
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of her friendships or enmities.”28 Without saying the word “neutrality,” Washington set
the foundation for a particular and unique brand of noninterventionist neutrality that
focused on both “extending commercial relations” and avoiding war.29 Therefore, due to
Washington’s vision of foreign relations, economic interest was born in U.S. neutrally
from the beginning.
Congress solidified Washington’s vision in the 1794 Neutrality Act. This
legislation officially prevented American citizens from “engaging in, or preparing for,
hostilities against any power, with which the United States was at peace.”30 This was a
significant move by the U.S. government, for it represented the most comprehensive
and formal declaration by a state to define the actions and obligations of international
neutrality. Furthermore, it also significantly incorporated these acts into the criminal
code, providing harsh penalties for those who violated American laws.31 This high
standard would later be praised by famed British diplomat Lord George Canning, who
said that “if I wished for a guide in the system of Neutrality, I should take that laid down
by the presidency of Washington.”32
Washington’s commerce–focused vision of neutral foreign relations served the
American economy well in the years after his presidency. As events in the Atlantic
continued to disrupt European mercantilist control over their New World markets, the
neutral U.S. merchant marine eagerly jumped at the opportunity to extend trade

28

George Washington Farewell Address, quoted in, William R., Manning, ed. Diplomatic
Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1925. 15.
29
Hyneman. 281.
30
Griffin, 97.
31
Fenwick, 27.
32
Lord George Canning, quoted in, Fenwick 28.
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networks to South America.33 At the beginning of the 19th century, U.S. commerce in
Latin America swelled, with American businessmen regularly trading with major Spanish
colonial ports as far south as Venezuela and the Rio de la Plata.34 In the years after
Washington’s Farewell Address, U.S. commercial interests began to be connected to
state security, as Latin American trade networks served as a major factor in overcoming
the massive war debt amassed during the Revolutionary War. As historian Stephan
Chambers put it, “if the national debt was the price of [American] independence, then
U.S-Cuba trade represented an expeditious opportunity for the new nation to begin to
settle its accounts.”35 This reliance on Latin American trade tied American commercial
interests with national security, connection that would both aid and jeopardize American
neutrality in the years to come.
French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion into Spain in 1808 became a
turning point in the direction of American neutrality, as it would tie American commercial
interests closer to South American markets. Not only did it serve to further weaken
Spanish imperial control over free trade, but the war necessity also created an immense
demand for American goods in Europe.36 By late 1808, American imports to the Spanish
Peninsula were three times greater than Latin American trade.37 Commander of the
English Peninsular forces, the Duke of Wellington, noted the impact U.S. trade made on
his war effort, commenting that “all this part of the [Spanish] Peninsula has been living

33

The United States had been trading with South American colonies since before Impendence.
However, before the French Revolution of 1789, Spain had a much tighter grip on its mercantilist
monopolies. Thus, if American merchants wanted to sell flour shipments to Cuba, they would first have to
go through Spain first. Peggy Liss. Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and Revolution, 1713-1826.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1982, 173.
34
The Rio de la Plata region incorporates modern day Argentina. Liss, 173-4.
35
Chambers, 21.
36
Griffin, 98.
37
Whitaker, 52.
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in American flour.”38 This “revolution in commerce” helped to “awaken” American
leaders to the economic possibilities of strong commercial relationship with South
America.39 No city benefited more from this awakening than Baltimore, who’s population
from 1790-1800 more than doubled, making it the third largest city in the U.S. by 1812.
Locals during this time claimed that trade transformed their city into a thriving market
where “fortunes were accumulated as if by magic.”40 Thus, in the early years of the 19th
century, Atlantic war equated to a lucrative financial opportunity for a neutral America,
as merchants and politicians sought to use the neutral label to advance their interests.41
In the years to come, this behavior would come to threaten national security, as
statesmen would stretch neutrality to the breaking point.
Napoleon’s actions did not just impact North Americans. In the south, a string of
revolutions erupted in 1810 and spread across the continent. These uprisings produced
leaders like Simón Bolívar of Venezuela, José de San Martín of Argentina, and
Bernardo O’Higgins of Chile, destined to liberate their native lands from Spanish rule.
As U.S. economic power grew more tightly connected to Latin American ports, policy
leaders from the United States watched these revolutions very closely.42 In 1810,
President James Madison began the practice of commissioning U.S. diplomats as

38

Liss, 173.
Whitaker, 26.
40
Laura Bornholdt. Baltimore and Early Pan-Americanism: A Study in the Background of the
Monroe Doctrine. Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing Company, 1949. 5.
41
Jerome R. Garitee. The Republic's Private Navy: The American Privateering Business as
Practiced by Baltimore during the War of 1812. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press,
1977. 27. In 1803, American President Thomas Jefferson secured the purchase of the Louisiana territory
from Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France. This “Louisiana Purchase,” a territorial land-grab that
doubled the size of the United States, would not have been possible without the economic stresses of war
weighing heavily on Napoleon. This was a major victory for expansionist statesmen, who eagerly took
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“agents” to serve state interests in the newly formed patriot governments. Given the title
“agent for commerce and seamen,” William Shaler became America’s first Latin
American agent, appointed to serve in the port of Vera Cruz.43 Realizing that America
“cannot be [an] unfeeling spectator [to] such an important moment,” Secretary of State
James Monroe commissioned two more agents to South American posts, adding Robert
Lowery to serve in Caracas and Joel Poinsett in Buenos Aires.44 As “agents” these men
operated in the commercial interests of the American government. However, they did
not work for the American government as state-sponsored “consuls,” as the patriot
governments were still unrecognized within the international community.45 David
DeForest, for example, was repeatedly rejected in his attempts to gain a consulship in
Buenos Aires, but nevertheless regularly petitioned powerful American merchants John
Jacob Astor and DeWitt Clinton to tie their North American wealth to his South
American business ventures.46 By employing “agents” and not “consuls, “the U.S.
symbolically distanced itself from the rebel republics, and in doing so, helped to
maintain the veneer of impartiality.47 However, by expanding and deepening the U.S.
economic reach into Latin American market, these early American diplomat-merchants
were actually threatening future Atlantic peace, as these transformed into the point-men
in charge of recruiting a generation of American adventurers to become privateers.48
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The War of 1812 was a transformative experience for the provincial American
state. Although it did not significantly change the map, the peace created in1815
significantly impacted the direction of American power in the coming years in two
important ways. War with Great Britain facilitated the recruitment of a large number of
sailors to combat the Royal Navy. When peace was secured in 1815, many of these
seasoned navy men would ply their skills as licensed privateers against Spain. The war
also positioned the U.S. for future conflict with Imperial Spain. Building off of lingering
tensions over disputed Louisiana Purchase territory, 1815 peace will come to place new
stains on Spanish-American relationship. The War of 1812 helped turn American
commercial interests south, and in doing so, it positioned the U.S. economic
expansionist leaders in direct conflict Spain, who still controlled those markets.49
Inflated with nationalist pride after the War of 1812, American statesmen will, under the
banner of neutrally, attempt to build the state by pushing against their Spanish
neighbors.50 However, this pushing will threaten a war that could ruin all their goals for
expanding American power economically and territorially.
*

*

*

*

*

For U.S. statesmen, peace in 1815 did not lessen the threat of future hostilities in
the Atlantic. In response to the ongoing Wars of South American Independence,
American President James Madison was quick to declare the United States’ neutrality in
the conflict.51 Citing the Neutrality Act of 1794, Madison kept open American ports to all
vessels, including those of the South American revolutionaries, outlawing only the
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arming and direct recruiting of sailors for those war-bound ships. The U.S. Government
also directly forbid its citizens from participating in the conflict via privateering or
filibustering.52 Although he formally claimed neutrality, Madison did not promise
impartiality, as he actually expanded on Washington’s commerce-focused neutrality to
meet the growing economic needs of his expansionist government. The original act in
1794 only mentioned “foreign princes and states,” as governing sovereigns with which a
neutral America could do business.53 Madison expanded the interpretation of America’s
neutral obligations to include rebelling colonies as legitimate governments.54 The U.S.
government never claimed the South American governments were legitimate, but the
U.S. ports, who welcomed ships flying all flags, treated them as such. This bold and
loose interpretation of the original act further shows that American neutrality after 1815
was a flexible entity. By engaging in a loose reading of American neutrality, Madison
wielded a commercially-friendly neutrality that aimed to meet the South American
Revolution’s dangers and opportunities.
The threat of European intervention terrified American leaders, and Madison’s
vague language sought to lessen the threat of war while at the same time expanding
America’s peace time economy.55 Adams captures this fear in his private letter to friend
William Plummer. “We have therefore enemies in almost every part of the world, and
few or no friends anywhere . . . with Spain we are . . . on the verge of war.”56 This
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anxiety influenced the American political elite, who saw war with Spain as disastrous to
their expansionist visions. Thus, the Madison administration deliberately sculpted a
federal policy toward South American that was officially neutral, but this neutrality was
not intended to be strictly impartial, as trade with both warring governments was
encouraged by U.S. statesmen.
In addition to the state’s aggressive economic and territorial goals, there were a
host of internal and external factors the made a strict and impartial neutrality nearly
impossible after 1815. Public opinion at this time weighed heavily in favor of the South
American patriots. Seeing a connection to their own revolution of 1776, many American
citizens toasted their “sister republics” down south in a shared sense of republican
triumph.57 One Washington newspaper proclaimed that by 1816 toasts to South
American success were nearly “universal.” Historian Caitlin Fitz compiled records of the
nation’s leading newspapers at the time, and concluded that beginning in 1815, around
the Unites States there were more than 70 toasts offered on the Fourth of July for
hemispheric independence.58 Popular opinion for patriot success even became a
personal matter, as towns and newborn babies were named “Bolívar,” after the
revolutionary general Simón Bolívar.59 Hero of the Battle of New Orleans and famed
Indian fighter, Andrew Jackson even named his favorite horse after the great South
American “Liberator.”60 The hundreds of toasts, songs, poems, and baby names that
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were created at that time clearly illustrate the overwhelming support the U.S. populace
had for the South American “sister republics.”
Whereas the general public could drunkenly toast Bolivar’s fight, the political elite
in Washington could not be so blatant in their support, as they were in charge of
maintaining the U.S.’s neutral position. In a private correspondence with John Quincy
Adams in 1815, Secretary of State Monroe wrote, “in the event that their independence
would be free and friendly [relationship] . . . there is no cause to doubt in which scale
our interest lies.”61 Although U.S. leaders were rarely this candid in discussing their
support, they were more open in voicing their negative opinion of Spain. A dangerous
tension with Spain first began after President Thomas Jefferson’s 1803 Louisiana
Purchase, an exchange Spanish ministers called “illegal” and “the most traitorous blow
that Bonaparte ever dealt the Spanish Monarchy.”62 Various territorial disputes along
the Mississippi River and Florida border eventually forced Secretary of State Madison to
sever diplomatic negotiations with Spanish minister Marqués de Casa Irujo.63 Although
formal, yet cool, communications formally returned in 1809 with the arrival of Spanish
minister Don Luis de Onís, the U.S. Government remained hostile to the Spanish
ministry.64 Therefore, from the Oval Office to the maternity ward, American society at
nearly every level supported the patriot fight against Spain, illustrating the internal
emotions that made maintaining U.S. impartiality difficult to uphold.
Given America’s hostile opinion of Spain, enthusiastic support for the “sister
republics,” and a commercially-focused neutrality policy, external challenges to the
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U.S.’s delicate neutrality arose almost immediately after 1815. The most significant
danger came from U.S. citizens serving as privateers for the unrecognized South
American governments. With no navies of their own, these states enthusiastically
encouraged men like DeForest to commission American sailors and veterans from the
War of 1812 to serve as privateers against Spanish imperial ships.65 Madison’s
neutrality policy indirectly facilitated this issue. Although the American government
prohibited its citizens from direct participation in the civil war, the private munitions trade
amongst individuals was considered rightful act of international trade.66 Spanish
American agents and North American merchants became very skilled at navigating the
various loopholes embedded in the old 1794 Act.67
To complicate matters, the commissions given to American seamen helped
deepen trade relationships first established in the early days of the French Revolution.
Hemispheric free trade was a major goal for state economic goals, and therefore the
vast tonnage of American made goods transported to the lucrative South American
ports was not initially seen as a completely bad deal.68 Though the threat of war kept
the government from overtly supporting the fight, these privateers nonetheless acted in
the interest of U.S. political elite. A weak Spain would no doubt help expansionist
politicians achieve their major goal of annexing Florida for the United States, as many in
the government believed Florida was the key to securing America’s southern border.69
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“Florida,” Monroe proclaimed in 1815, “is of the highest importance.”70 This was a
delicate and dangerous balance though. Initially, from 1815 to 1816, these privateers
served American interests to a weaken Spain and expand South American markets.
The munition trade was big businesses, as port cities like Baltimore collected huge
revenue from port fees and taxes.71 Privateers were also aiding in goal of expanding
free trade into the Caribbean and South American markets, as they helped force open
the cracks established in Spanish mercantilist economy.72 But, these agents of
American interests metastasized into agents of chaos as their indiscriminate marauding
took America’s leadership to the edge of war.
However, U.S. diplomats initially downplayed the seriousness of the privateering
threat placed on American Atlantic peace. The dramatic rise in privateer activity against
Spain from 1815 to 1816 resulted in immediate complaints from the Spanish minster in
America, Don Luis Onís. American policy makers at the time cared little about the agent
from Spain. Adams once quipped that Onís was “cold, calculating, and wily,” and
possessed the characteristics of a “finished scholar in the Spanish procrastination
school of diplomacy.”73 Onís wasted no time rising concern about blatant violations of
America’s neutrality policy, pointing explicitly to U.S. ammunition, men, and supplies
sent to Cartagena.74 Onís often complained to Washington armed with the exact names
of men and ships who broke neutrality.75 In a diplomatic letter to Onís in early 1816,
Monroe explained to the Spanish minister that the U.S. righteously observed the neutral
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obligations and privileges expressed in the 1794 Act, and that America did nothing to
aid or hinder either warring party.76 Monroe and Adams will react to future complaint by
giving Onís this usual response. With faith in the legal system to bring justice to any
violator, American statesmen for the remainder of 1816 dismissed Spanish complaints
as rumors or accusations lacking the necessary proof of support.77 By dismissing the
various concerns voiced by Spanish and Portuguese officials, American leaders were
testing the flexibility of their neutral policy. Though South American privateering
disproportionately preyed upon Spanish ships, neither President Madison nor Secretary
of State Monroe was willing to curtail or recognize the obvious violations. As the White
House changed hands, this issue, left unchecked by the Madison administration, would
come to a head in the following years.
James Monroe assumed more than just the presidency in 1816. He also inherited
a legacy of expansionist policies that characterized his presidential predecessors.
Although the United States had been pushing westward since colonial times, the most
significant event in recent years was Thomas Jefferson’s “Louisiana Purchase.” With
this land grab, Jefferson sough to transform the U.S. into a hemispheric “empire of
liberty.” 78 Monroe inherited this set of expansionist ideals that connected state security
to territorial growth. 79 With the return of peace in 1815, U.S. politicians cast their gaze
south, towards Florida, the Caribbean, and even distant Spanish Texas.80
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Expansion in the Early Republic was not limited to territory, for U.S. merchants
and economic elites eagerly sought to extend trade relationships in the years following
the War of 1812. With its lucrative exports of coffee, sugar, rum, and Latin American
specie, no market was more important to future American economic growth than
Cuba.81 Adams later wrote that Cuba was, at the time, “an object of transcendent
importance to the political and economic importance of our Nation.”82 Senator John C.
Calhoun concurred, claiming in 1818 that “trade with Havana alone” was the most
important source of specie for the U.S., without which the U.S. economy would be an
“embarrassment.”83 Protecting the Cuban trade relationship from war, therefore, was a
matter of national security. As influential American General Thomas Jesup proclaimed,
“Cuba [is] the key to all western America, whether we consider it in a military, political,
or economic point of view.”84
This aggressive expansionism also bred fear, as Monroe and his contemporaries
were deeply concerned about European intervention in the Western Hemisphere.
Having had Britain invade their home twice and been in hemispheric proximity to
various European interactions in the Caribbean and South America, the American
political elite believed that European powers would continue to interference in American
political matters. U.S. leadership especially feared any reason that would invite England
to increase their presence in the Caribbean. General Jesup further explained, “we have
nothing to fear from Cuba in the feeble hands of Spain, but in the hand of Great Britain,
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it [would] become so formidable as to menace the independence of our country.”85
Therefore, for James Monroe, who saw this threat of intervention, especially from Great
Britain, as “dangerous to our peace and safely,” American national security must be
calculated within the range of the whole Atlantic.86 In the following years, from 1816 to
1818, various external and internal threats grew to threaten the status quo carefully
constructed by the architects of American strategic neutrality.
Given the near ideological fear of European intervention in the Western
Hemisphere, President Monroe understood that navigating the volatile Atlantic as a
neutral nation required a high degree of caution and attentiveness. Calling his approach
“watchful waiting,” Monroe’s foreign policy strategy was deliberately slow and cautious,
allowing him to react appropriately to events that could threaten both war and his
expansionist goals.87 In action, “watchful waiting” meant that Monroe would use
neutrality to his advantage, as a guide for future policies and decisions aimed at
maximizing American interests while keeping the nation out of war. By 1819, the
Transcontinental Treaty exemplified the success of Monroe’s cautious policy, but, in
order to get there, Monroe had to face serious challenges that, if not handled properly,
could send America to war with Spain.
The first political challenge to test Monroe’s neutral policy was the continuation
and growth of American privateering in South American waters. During Monroe’s
presidency, the privateering problem exploded, as more than 3,000 North Americans
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took to the sail during his first term.88 It was not only individual citizens caught up in the
extralegal affair, whole cities became complicit in the privateering enterprise. Baltimore,
in particular, saw privateering as a business, and profits from the high seas enterprise
benefitted almost all sectors of the Baltimore economy.89 One infamous Baltimorean
merchant David Didier, looked forward to the personal economic benefits another war,
so that “we may make use of our fast schooners.”90 To make matters worse, by late
1817 and 1818, many American privateers began to turn piratical, preying on all
vessels, including fellow American ships.91
The increased scope, frequency, and range of attack (Spanish officials in Cadíz
claimed to see American ships off the Spanish Coast) resulted in the increased uproar
voiced by Spanish and Portuguese governments.92 Onís now derided the Monroe
Administration for its poor control over its own citizens, saying, “the mischiefs resulting
from the toleration of the armament of privateers in the ports of this Union, and of
bringing into them, with impunity, the plunder made by these privateers on the Spanish
trade,” demanded for “the punishment, according to the law, of those turbulent and
seditious individuals who have taken up arms within the territory of this confederation,
and from these carrying desolation, destruction and horror into the frontier provinces of
the Crown of Spain.” Onís then twisted the knife of international embarrassment into
Monroe, saying that these actions “so deeply compromise the neutrality of the United
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States in the eyes of all nations.”93 Criticism like these hit home, as in 1816, British
officials claimed it was “common knowledge” within the international community that the
U.S. was routinely breaking its neutrality laws.94
The rising number of marauding corsairs was not the only external threat to
American neutrality faced by Monroe early on into his term. In late 1816, a group of
South American agents led by the Chilean patriot José Miguel Carrera entered the
United States on a mission to have the U.S. government directly finance their revolution.
Although the government quickly rebuked their offer, the “Carrera Cabal” nevertheless
met with some of the richest and most influential Americans at the time, including De
Witt Clinton, Arron Burr, Thurlow Weed, and John Jacob Astor.95 While none of these
Americans gave in to the Chilean’s demands, the fact that South American
revolutionaries could so openly petition a neutral nation’s most powerful individuals
revealed how fragile America’s Atlantic peace actually was.
Although, by the summer of 1817, an even greater threat to Monroe’s neutrality
was washing up on the shore of Amelia Island. Located off the coast of Florida, Amelia
Island was a small plot of land controlled by Spain. In June of 1817, Gregor MacGregor,
a Scottish adventurer and soldier of fortune, seized the island’s small Spanish garrison,
raised the “Green Cross of Florida,” and thusly claimed the island for himself.96
MacGregor’s island republic may have been small, but its impact was significant.
Having a rouge dictatorship within miles of the U.S. mainland was an international
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embarrassment for a neutral state, as MacGregor’s republic became both a pirate den,
illegal slave trade trafficker, and contraband market.97
Not all threats came in the form of foreign actors, as one of the most persistent
issue discrediting U.S. neutrality resulted from its very own judicial system. The same
popular opinion that inspired so many citizens to name their children “Bolivar” also
resulted in friendly juries for those privateers who fought for the young South American
republics. In particular, the Maryland District Court in Baltimore was notoriously friendly
to convicted privateers, as its judges dismissed two-thirds of the cases that came before
them.98 In one infamous case, Spanish ministers brought to court documented proof of
privateering activity committed by notorious Baltimorean merchant Thomas Taylor,
however, despite such strong evidence, it only took the judge ten minutes to acquit
Taylor of all wrongful acts.99 Adjudicating neutrally law confused even the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States John Marshall, who noted the “difficulty there
may be, under our municipal institutions, in punishing as pirates, citizens of the U.S.
who take from a State as war with Spain, a commission to cruise against that power.”100
All these issues bringing justice against real violations of international neutrality caused
Spanish ministers to proclaim that it was “impossible” for Spain to achieve justice in
American courts.101 Although admiralty courts eventually gave Spain the justice she
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deserved, in the early years of his first term, Monroe could not even count on his
judiciary to protect his government from threats to his neutrality policy.102
In the face of all these various external and internal threats, Monroe did not sit
idly by. Confident in his slow and careful approach, Monroe was deliberate and
calculating in how he went about defusing these dangers. The White House at this time
truly believed that one wrong or overly aggressive move could trigger a disastrous war
against Spain and its ally Great Britain.103 Therefore, opportunistic patience was a
critical factor in Monroe’s ultimate success, as “watchful waiting” eventually paid off in
the signing of the Transcontinental Treaty in 1819. Monroe’s strategy for combating the
issues threatening state neutrality was a two-prong attack that centered on domestic
politics and foreign military action.
The first step was to amend some of the obvious flaws in the old 1794 Neutrality
Act. By 1817, Monroe and others were convinced that the old act could not serve the
purposes of a revolutionary Atlantic. One of the most glaring and damning flaws was
that, while the old act clearly banned the U.S. Government from selling arms to
belligerents, it said nothing about the private sale of munitions from one American
individual to another foreign citizen.104 The 1794 Act also did not explicitly say anything
about the role colonies played on the international stage. Thus, in the first months of
1817, President Monroe began the process of enacting a new Neutrality Act that would
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better serve the current needs of his administration and protect the U.S. government
from his opportunistic privateering constituents.
MacGregor and his Amelia Island republic was a more sensitive situation. This
issue dominated October cabinet meetings, as policymakers wrestled with the idea of
breaking up the notorious pirate den, and if that action would cause Spain to react in
war.105 Monroe ultimately reasoned that since it was evident that MacGregor’s camp
was made for “smuggling, if not piratical purposes,” then the U.S. Government had the
right to seize the island.106 Secretary of State Adams put the decision more bluntly, “the
marauding parties at Amelia and Galveston [must] be broken up immediately.”107
Although this sort of American interventionism seems normal activity to the modern
reader, in 1817, this clearly non-neutral attack on foreign soil was a bold and dramatic
move calculated to swiftly end the destabilizing threat of pirates. Thus, this attack
revealed Monroe’s willingness to use a centralized show of force to defeat threats to his
administration’s agenda. The seizure of Amelia was more than a symbolic step closer to
the goal of acquiring Florida, it revealed a turning point in Monroe’s usage of state
neutrality, as direct intervention used in the protection of neutrality was now a strategy.
108

In claiming that U.S. state neutrally was under attack, Monroe was able bend

American neutrally to suit his administration’s goals.
Monroe also used covert diplomatic action to protect neutrality. In 1817, Monroe
commissioned three American agents on secret fact-finding mission to South America.
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The purpose of this trip was to acquire first-hand intelligence on the progress of the civil
war.109 For this mission, the Monroe Administration chose Caesar Augustus Rodney,
John Graham, and Henry Brackenridge to represent the neutral attitudes of the U.S.
government.110 Richard Rush, acting Secretary of State, wrote to the men explaining by
their government need their service in this transnational drama:
The contest, by the extension of the revolutionary movement and the
greater stability which it appears to have acquired, becomes daily of more
importance to the United States. It is by success that the colonists acquire
new claims on other powers, which it may comport neither with their
interests nor duty to disregard. Several of the colonies having declared
their independence and enjoyed it some years, and the authority of Spain
being shaken in others, its seems probable that, if the parities be left to
themselves, the most permanent political changes will be effected. It
therefore seems incumbent on the United States to watch the movement
in its subsequent steps with particular attention.111
This was a shrewd diplomatic move, as Monroe sought clarity before taking any public
steps towards recognizing the rebelling governments. Although patriot forces under
Bolívar and San Martín were making progress by 1817, Monroe still feared that any
premature move in overt favor of the South Americans would offend the monarchal
powers of Europe and give them cause to join Spain against the republican
revolutionaries.112 Thus, before Monroe took any steps closer to recognize the new
republics, he had to get tangible information on the ground. The information gained by
this mission will embolden the president, allowing him more flexibility to bend U.S.
neutrality in the nation’s interest.
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Due to the various proactive steps taken in 1817 to mend Atlantic tensions and
better secure the U.S. position, Monroe was well positioned for a December address
Congress and members of the Senate.113 This address was important, as Monroe would
not only reaffirmed the nation’s neutrality policy but also elevated the status of the
revolutionaries to “equals” with Spain.114 Although far from a declaration of recognition
for southern independence, this address acknowledged that patriot victory could be a
reality. As Monroe openly stated, since the “early stages,” the Wars for South American
Independence were “highly interesting to the United States.”115 Therefore, establishing
friendly discourse now would help facilitate post-revolution friendships. Nevertheless,
this was no doubt a major diplomatic slight against imperial Iberia. Additionally, the
president even appeared to offer a justification for his citizens caught up in patriotic
republican fervor, saying “it was natural that our citizens should sympathize in events
which affected their neighbors.”116 Finally, in a precursor to the Monroe Doctrine’s future
theme, Monroe made a bold assertion for the status of the nation’s rights and privileges
along its borders. Speaking of raids against pirates at Amelia and Galveston, Monroe
said:

This enterprise has been marked in a more signal manner by all the
objectionable circumstances . . . and more particularly by the equipment of
privateers which have annoyed our commerce, and by smuggling. These
establishments if ever sanctioned by any authority whatever . . . have
abused their trust and forfeited all claims to consideration. A just regard for
113
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the rights and interests of the United States required that they should be
suppressed, and order have been accordingly issued to that effect.117
Although Monroe’s first annual address revealed how the president considered state
security linked to foreign policy, there were still some issues raised. Monroe was open
about the fact that diplomatic progress with Spain was stalled, and had not moved since
the Madison years. Despite all the peripheral actions aimed at maintaining peace,
Monroe still had not dealt with the main national security threat: a porous neutrality law.
As privateers still roamed the Atlantic threatening American security, Monroe in late
1817 reaffirmed the “impartial neutrality” of the United States.118 By doing so, the
president circled 1818 as the pivotal year to create a new neutrally law that allowed the
watchful and waiting Washington elite to achieve their expansionist goals.
Due to a series of planned and spontaneous events, the year 1818 became a
turning point in the establishment of a more secure American neutrality. Although the
process began in 1817, by 1818, Monroe finally had a substantial revision in place to fix
the porous 1794 act. Jokingly labeled by Congress as a “peace treaty between Spain
and this city of Baltimore,” the 1818 revision fixed the major oversights in the 1794 Act
that allowed so many privateers to be fitted out in American ports.119 However, approval
of this revision was not unanimous amongst American politicians. The most vocal critic
of this policy change was Henry Clay, senator from Kentucky. An ardent nationalist,
Clay believed that the U.S. should drop all pretenses of neutrality and openly recognize
the South American governments. Clay feared Europe, and especially England,
monopolizing South American wealth. To Clay, if the U.S. did not recognize the rebel
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governments and entrench future trading relationships, then America could remain "sort
of independent colonies of England—politically free, commercially slaves.”120 In Clay’s
mind, whatever the risk, the state benefited from all actions and policies that contributed
to the continued dissolution of the Spanish Empire.
However, Clay’s vision of a hemispheric economic relationship was built out of
unrealistic idealism and not practical realities, as trade with the Caribbean was far more
profitable and did not risk America’s neutrality in the process.121 Therefore, in a vote of
115 to 45, Congress reaffirmed the careful policy of watchful waiting. Along with the
Amelia and Galveston missions, this victory represented another strong centralized
move by President Monroe aimed at stabilizing Atlantic chaos in America’s favor. Proof
of this increased sense of stability and confidence showed up in March 1818, when
Congress, for the first time, openly debated diplomatically recognizing the new South
American republics.122 Although Monroe would not formally recognize them until 1822,
this bold move made in the face of Spain could not have been made before now. In
strengthening the nation’s defenses against the individual actors who risked war,
Monroe’s Neutrality Act of 1818 positioned the U.S. one step closer to achieving a
lasting peace settlement with Spain and other European interventionists.123
The Neutrality Act of 1818 was the culmination of a multiyear effort to protect
American impartiality in a chaotic Atlantic World. Whereas the revision was a deliberate
and thought-out event, U.S. General Andrew Jackson thrived in spontaneity. Having
once claimed that he was “born for the storm,” Old Hickory was a man of action, and in
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1818, he invaded Spanish Florida, capturing several forts in the process.124 Jackson’s
Florida invasion could have resulted in a diplomatic disaster, as Monroe acknowledged
in a letter to James Madison, that the capturing of Spanish forts could be seen as a
violation of the neutrality act.125 However, instead of ruining Monroe’s watchful waiting
policy, it actually revealed the strengths of Monroe’s diplomacy. American leaders have
long coveted the Florida territory, and Monroe saw in Jackson’s aggression an
opportunity to expose Spanish institutional weakness for American territorial gain.126 In
a letter to Thomas Jefferson, Monroe explained his strategy:
The occurrence at Pensacola, has been full of difficulty, but without
incurring the charge of committing a break of the Constitution, or of giving
the Spanish just cause for war, we have endeavored to turn it into the best
account of our country, and credit the Commanding General. We shall tell
the Spanish Minister [Onís], that the post will be delivered up, but that their
attack, was owing to the misconduct of the Spanish officers, whose
punishment would be . . . [that America] must keep a strong force in
Florida.127
By not condemning Jackson and blaming instead the Spanish for the invasion, Monroe
spun U.S. military aggression into a defensive act protecting national neutrality. In doing
so, he revealed the power and strength embedded in the flexible neutrality he had been
crafting. Monroe therefore spun Jackson’s recklessness into political gain, as the White
House “punished” Spanish “misconduct” by occupying their territory. “As long as we do
not wound too deeply her pride by holding [Florida],” Monroe conspired, “there is much
reason to presume that this act will furnish strong inducement to Spain to cede the
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territory.”128 Watchful waiting may have been a slow-play policy, but it was by no means
passive. Rather, it centered on the active use of strategic and flexible neutrally and
required a keen eye for seizing opportunity in the moment. By “taking and holding all of
Florida,” Monroe’s actions show that he was actively using a contradictory neutrality
policy for state-building purposes.129 As a result, Monroe revealed Spanish weaknesses
and forced them to negotiations that would at long last stabilize America’s Atlantic
relations.
*

*

*

*

*

From the years 1816 to 1818, President James Monroe crafted a foreign policy
for a chaotic Atlantic that centered on a flexible and sometimes contradictory neutrality
law. Although this policy was at times contrary to America’s impartiality pledge, it
nonetheless served to achieve significant state-building goals of the expansionist
politicians. U.S. neutrally law was born with commerce in mind, and American politicians
of the Early Republic utilized the post War of 1812 peace to extend the economy into
the Spanish Atlantic.130 The generation of American statesmen who took power in 1815
faced the challenge of producing a foreign policy that allowed for territorial expansion
and that protected trade in the lucrative Caribbean and South American markets. Given
the widespread and real fear within these diplomats over European interventionist
actions, Presidents Madison and Monroe embraced and redefined Washingtonian
neutrality to fit the purposes of a new volatile Atlantic world. Whereas it was Madison
who initially declared America’s impartiality in the South American Wars for
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Independence, Monroe was the president who best used U.S. neutrality to the nation’s
advantage. Although he openly condemned the individual privateers who attacked the
Spanish, Monroe himself was not afraid to bend American neutrality by strategically
deploying violence against Spanish territory.
Neutrality in Monroe’s hands was neither impartial nor noninterventionist. His
administration, as well as the vast majority of the U.S. public, supported the Spanish
colonists who fought Spanish imperial rule. He also allowed for the seizure of Spanish
land, which included several islands and the whole territory of Florida. However,
Monroe’s unique definition of neutrality was far from careless. In a deliberate and
careful policy he called “watchful waiting,” the U.S. president maneuvered Atlantic
diplomacy with patience and a keen eye for opportunity. Using both foreign action and
domestic legislation when individually called for, Monroe by 1819 had not only avoided
war but also positioned his leading diplomat John Quincy Adams to make a
transcendent peace treaty with Spanish Minister Onís.131 The 1819 Transcontinental
Treaty, also known as the Adam-Onís Treaty, ceded all of Spanish Florida to the United
States, as well as officially defining the western border of the Louisiana Purchase
territory.132 Until the Monroe Doctrine five years later, this treaty marked a defining
achievement for the Monroe administration. Secretary of State Adams proclaimed "the
acquisition of Florida has long been an object of earnest desire to this country. The
acknowledgment of a definite line of boundary to the south sea forms a great epoch in
our history."133 This epoch was also triumphed by the popular press, as one newspaper
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stated, “in a word, it is a treaty more than which the most sanguine have not anticipated
to be more favorable. It is one that fully comes up the expectations of the great body of
the American people."134 With this treaty signed, Monroe secured a national security,
territorial, and economic victory, as the Floridian land secured the vulnerable underbelly
of the American state. Peace also guaranteed the existence of the vital Cuban trade
relationship to American markets. Therefore, the Transcontinental Treaty represented
the crowning achievement of Monroe’s watchful waiting, a neutrality policy that set the
stage for future state growth. Although the Monroe Doctrine will be remembered as the
most significant foreign policy achievement, Monroe’s willingness to embrace the
contrary values of "consensus and fragmentation,” “continuity and innovation,” and
“change and stagnation,” he created the stability necessary for such a proclamation to
be made in 1823.135
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Chapter 3: Money Bags and Cannon Balls: The First Bribery War and the Expansion of
American Presidential Power

"What is practical must often control what is pure theory"
- Thomas Jefferson, 1802

The morning of October 31st, 1803 broke bright with opportunity for Captain
William Bainbridge, commander of the forty-two gun American frigate, the USS
Philadelphia. Operating under the orders of America’s third Mediterranean commodore
in three years, Edward Prebel, Bainbridge and the Philadelphia were a part of an
American blockade of the Tripolitan coastline. In 1803, this naval noose was President
Thomas Jefferson’s answer to a series of piratical actions on American merchant
vessels committed by the North African regencies, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli.
Together, these states were known as the Barbary Coast. Preble’s orders, given to him
by the Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith indicated that he was “at liberty to pursue the
dictates of [his] own judgement” to conduct a blockade against Tripoli and, in doing so,
“annoy the enemy” with “all the means in [his] power.”136 On the 31st of October, Captain
Bainbridge saw his opportunity to “annoy the enemy” when a Tripolitan ketch attempted
to slip past his blockade. Bainbridge gave chase, and in the shallow Mediterranean
waters, Bainbridge ran his frigate aground on a bed of reefs.137 Unable to free the heavy
ship and within range of Tripoli’s naval batteries, Bainbridge surrendered the
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Philadelphia to the Bey of Tripoli without firing a shot.138 That morning, not only did the
United States of America lose one of its most impressive ships but also its crew of three
hundred and seven American citizens, who would now be enslaved by Tripoli’s Islamic
regency. Jefferson called this black day a “national stain,” and the “most serious
[disaster] which has happened to the present administration.”139
Jefferson’s strong reaction to this capture resulted from his core Republican
belief in the value of free oceanic trade. With the loss of British protection after the
successful American Revolution, North African corsairs began seizing American ships
and sailors in 1784.140 By 1794, these Barbary attacks reached crisis level, with more
than eleven American vessels captured and more then 120 citizens enslaved.141 As a
response to “the depredations committed by the Algerine corsairs on the commerce of
the United States,” the George Washington administration called for the creation of a
standing American Navy, and in March, 1794, Congress enacted its first Navy Bill, as a
means to protect the young republics’ commercial independence. 142
Despite creating a Navy for the protection of American trade against North
African privateers, the Federalist administrations of both George Washington and John
Adams sought resolution through tributes rather than cannon balls. By bribing the
Muslim regencies, Americans could regain access to the lucrative Mediterranean trade
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unmolested. However, these tributes came at an incredible cost.143 Just one peace deal
with Algiers, by far the most prolific threat to shipping in the 1790s, cost the U.S. both
one million dollars and a thirty-six gun American-made frigate. Seeing Algiers’s success
in forcing America into tributary status, Morocco, Tripoli, and Tunis also threaten attacks
in return for tribute. A full Mediterranean peace was achieved by 1797, but the price of
opening up the sea for commerce cost one and a half million dollars, totaling to twenty
percent of the national budget.144 This was a crippling strain on the federal treasury, as
the young nation relied on its export trade as a primary means to pay off the immense
debt earned by the American War for Independence.145
For nearly two decades, Thomas Jefferson watched as Barbary “pirates” injured
and threatened American free trade in the Mediterranean. A firm believer in the
republican concept of “free ships make free goods,” Jefferson viewed these North
Africans attacks and subsequent tributes as dangers to the future success and growth
of the United States. As a republican, Jefferson believed that nations, like human
beings, had a lifespan, and therefore, these Mediterranean attacks represented assaults
on a vital trade artery responsible for keeping the young United States vibrant and
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free.146 Thus, Jefferson rejected the Federalist approach of his predecessors as
damaging future American progress. Claiming himself to be the “enemy of all these
douceurs, tributes, and humiliations,” Jefferson rejected the notion that America could
purchase peace from the Barbary Coast. Ever since his time as Minister to France in
the 1780s, Jefferson had remained steadfast in his belief that “nothing will stop the
eternal increase from these pirates but the presence of an armed force” in the
Mediterranean.147 Although he lacked the political power to dictate national foreign
policy as a minister and vice president, by 1801, Thomas Jefferson was in the White
House finally handing him the power to apply his long standing demand for military
action.148
Since 1786, Jefferson nursed his conviction that the American government
should stand up to the Barbary Coast with force instead of tribute.149 In 1801 when he
won the presidency, Jefferson received his chance to apply his longstanding rhetoric
into action. However, the Barbary War that will come to Jefferson in 1801 and last until
1805 will be a moment that tests Jefferson’s own republican convictions. Although
Jefferson came into office wielding a coherent and longstanding strategy, when faced
with the realities of war, Jefferson will be compelled to abandon his Republican principle
in order to achieve the military victory his agrarian vision for the U.S. demanded. The
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Barbary War against Tripoli therefore illustrates a moment of transition for President
Jefferson, a time in which Republican rhetoric was challenged by the ever-changing
dynamics of trans-Atlantic warfare. In order to achieve his Republican goals, Jefferson
adopted federalist strategies. A turning point in this transition hit Jefferson in 1803,
when news of the Philadelphia disaster came to Washington. The Philadelphia capture
turned a war fought with limited means into a time sensitive humanitarian crisis, which
compelled Jefferson to change his tactics against the Tripolitans. Challenged by a
moment of international crisis, the Barbary War revealed Jefferson’s republican
character as both flexible and adaptable, a leadership style allowed him to successfully
project and protect American interest across the ocean. Using Federalist means to
achieve Republican goals, Jefferson defined the role of Commander-in-Chief, and as a
result, significantly expanded the power of the executive unlike any president before
him.
*

*

*

*

*

Jefferson’ character has been a topic of scholarly fascination for many years.
Even Jefferson’s founding peers noted his complex enigmatic personality. Friend and
political rival John Adams explained that, whereas “almost every other American
statesman might be described in . . . broad brush strokes . . . Jefferson could be painted
only touch by touch, with a fine pencil and the perfection of the likeness depend upon
the shifting and uncertain flicker of the semi-transparent shadows.”150 Modern historians
too have struggled to catch Jefferson in the right light. Through the years, scholars have
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portrayed the Virginian as everything from an atheist to a zealot.151 However, the best
scholarship about the man stays away from the hardline moral absolutes found in
Jefferson works during the 1960s-90s. Since 1990, historians have leaned into the
moral and ideological complexities that characterize Jefferson. Authors like Joseph Ellis,
Peter Onuf, Gordon Wood, and Jon Meacham have all written excellent accounts of
Jefferson’s character. Whereas Ellis’ well-titled 1997 book American Sphinx painted
Jefferson as more ideologically rigid, recent scholarship, like John Boles’ Jefferson:
Architect of American Liberty readily acknowledges the man’s mysteries, writing, “in the
end, [Jefferson] is the most attractive, most elusive, most complicated, most intellectual,
most practical, most idealistic, most flexible, and most quintessentially American
Founder of them all.”152 It is within this idea of Jefferson as the most practical, idealistic,
and flexible that I engage the man. Jon Meacham wrote in Thomas Jefferson: The Art of
Power, “to realize his vision, [Jefferson] compromised and improvised. The willingness
to do what he needed to do in a given moment makes him an elusive historical figure.
Yet in the real world, in real time, when he was charged with the safety of the nation, his
creative flexibility made him a transformative leader.”153 Meacham’s desire to find place
Jefferson in real time and in the real world corresponds with my argument, but unlike
many of these historians, I will engage Jefferson’s within the real world of trans-Atlantic
warfare.
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However, within the vast literature surrounding Jefferson, very few historians
have engaged Jefferson’s character through the lens of foreign policy. Writing in 1990,
historians Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson co-authored Empire of Liberty, which
instantly became the preeminent source on Jeffersonian foreign policy. In their view,
Jefferson directed the ship of state with a strong idealistic and moralistic vision.
However, Tucker and Hendrickson only analyzed Jefferson’s diplomacy in domestic and
European issues. Except for five pages of endnotes, the Barbary War of 1801-1805 was
almost completely omitted from their study, and even there, they consider the war “less
than vital to the state.”154 Two decades later, Francis Cogliano revisited and revised the
modern scholarship regarding Jeffersonian diplomacy. His 2014 book, Emperor of
Liberty now stands as the best account of Jefferson’s role as foreign diplomat from his
early political career and into his presidency. In line with the recent Jefferson
historiography, Cogliano rejects Tucker and Hendrickson’s view of Jefferson the idealist,
and instead, Cogliano argues that Jefferson was a realist. “Although he was guided by a
clear ideological vision for the American republic,” Cogliano argues, “he was pragmatic
about the means he employed to protect the republic and advance its strategic
interests.”155 Unlike Tucker and Hendrickson, Cogliano analyses the Barbary War as
proof of Jefferson’s consistent view of foreign policy.
This paper will advance the recent scholarship about Jefferson’s foreign policy by
using the Barbary Wars as a case study for the transformation in leadership
characteristics witnessed during his presidency. Although the Barbary War has been
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covered by popular and military historians, it remains an understudied episode in
Thomas Jefferson’s political career.156 Whereas Cogliano argued that Jefferson
employed a consistent vision and strategy against Tripoli, I argue that the capture of the
USS Philadelphia was an important turning point in Jefferson’s presidency, compelling
him to adopt a more Federalist approach towards achieving his republican goals. 157
Whereas other historians have noted Jefferson’s flexibility, few have analyzed it within
the crucible of war. Thus, this paper situates the Barbary War as a moment that defined
Jefferson’s transformative pragmatism. That transformation challenged Jefferson’s
Republican committed towards running a frugal and small government. By 1805,
Jefferson had successfully achieved a peace that reopened the Mediterranean to free
American trade, but to do so, he had to dramatically increase the power of the nascent
American navy, enact a sweeping tax program, and become the first American
president to endorse a foreign regime change through a revolutionary military coup
d’état.
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Jefferson first articulated his desire to use force against the Barbary Coast in
1786. At that time, the Washington administration dispatched Jefferson to Paris as
America’s first Minister to France. Washington requested that Jefferson and John
Adams, the Minister to England, articulate a U.S. strategy to handle the corsair crisis. In
a diplomatic dispatch to Adams, Jefferson argued that the United States “should prefer
the obtaining of [peace] by war,” and gave the following explanations for justifying his
opinion: “Honor favors it . . . it will procure us respect in Europe, and respect is a
safeguard to our interest . . . I think it least expensive.”158 Adams, however, countered
Jefferson’s opinion, arguing that the more prudent move for the financially and militarily
weak nation would be to purchase peace. Adam’s calculated that future trade earned in
the Mediterranean would more than make up for the continued cost of tribute to the
North African powers.159 President Washington agreed with Adams, and thus, his 1795
peace with Algiers set a two decade long U.S precedent of buying and bribing the
Barbary for peace.160
In Jefferson’s mind, the direction of American foreign policy was a direct result of
his Republican vision for an expansive agrarian republic. Believing that that “cultivators
of the earth are the most valuable citizens,” Jefferson saw the “yeoman farmer” as the
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backbone responsible for supporting the young United States’ agrarian future.161 These
industrious and virtuous farmers were not to simply be subsistence producers, that
would invite sloth upon the nation. Rather, they were to be the pushing force behind an
expanding agrarian republic that sought growth from the virtues of agriculture rather
than European-style manufacturing.162 The critical connecting factor to Jefferson’s
vision of America’s political economy was therefore access to a vigorous overseas
trade.163 Commerce and the maintenance of free trade were intimately connected to
Jefferson’s foreign policy objectives. If Jefferson’s yeomen did not have access to
foreign markets, then they would risk slipping into stagnate subsistence farmers whose
lazy and idle lifestyle was deemed detrimental to republican virtues. Thus, the protection
of America’s Republican experience was critically connected to a secure and open trade
route.164 In Jefferson’s mind, American warfare, limited in scope and purposefully
designed, protected American welfare.
The belief in Mediterranean trade being a vital artery supporting American
economic and moral health was not merely a lofty metaphysical concern. Rather, trade
into the Mediterranean markets actually served as an important economic lifeline for an
American economy desperate to pay off extensive debt incurred during the
Revolutionary War. After the War for Independence, the U.S. became the largest
neutral carrier of goods for the Western world. From 1700 to 1807, the value of all
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goods involved in foreign trade expanded from 40% to 92%. In monetary terms,
combined imports and exports in 1790 totaled to $43 million, and by 1807, that total
skyrocketed to $246 million.165 Within that trade boom, Jefferson calculated that onesixth of all wheat and flour exported and a quarter of all dried and pickled fish went to
Mediterranean ports. This Mediterranean trade involved more than one hundred ships
annually, loaded with twenty thousand tons, and employed more than twelve hundred
seamen.166 Therefore, when Barbary corsairs began threatening this vital trade route,
Jefferson could only see these attacks as existential threats to the very future of
America. Jefferson’s ideological commitment thus defined his reaction to the Barbary
crisis, committing him to the firm belief that only force could save America’s agrarian
future. Jefferson took both these ideological commitments and fears to Washington.
Thomas Jefferson called his presidential election “the revolution of 1800,” but
when war with Tripoli came to Jefferson in 1801, “continuity,” not “change,” will
characterize his presidential leadership in the theatre of foreign policy.167 As the Barbary
War illustrated, instead of dismantling an expansionist military and fiscal state, Jefferson
actually empowered the federal government in a manner far beyond that of his federalist
predecessors.168 In order to achieve victory against Tripoli and secure his Republican
policy of free trade, Jefferson had to adopt strong-handed unilateral policies. Republican
peace, therefore, took Federalist-inspired action. Although the Barbary War illustrates
an ideology in transition, Jefferson was not a perfect war-time leader.169 As the nation’s
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first Commander in Chief to lead a nation through open war, Jefferson conducted his
war to protect trade in an uneven and largely ineffective manner, where his rhetoric of
force rarely translated to real military action. Although the American Navy secured a
victory in 1805, the war was plagued by mishaps, embarrassments, and missed
opportunities for four years. Nevertheless, by the end of the Frist Barbary War,
President Jefferson will have set a powerful precedent, that executives could wield the
power of the national government to realize personal foreign policy goals.
After years of preaching force, President Jefferson entered the White House in
1801 and immediately sought to implement his vision of an interventionist U.S. foreign
policy in the Mediterranean. By 1801, Tripoli had established itself as America’s primary
North African adversary.170 In addition to recently violating the 1797 Treaty by capturing
U.S. merchant vessels, the Bashaw of Tripoli demanded a tributary increase of $100,00
to match that of Algiers. Condemning the idea of tributes as “money thrown away,”
Jefferson fumed that “there [was] no end to the demand of these powers, nor any
security in their promises.”171 In response to this challenge, Jefferson called a cabinet
meeting within the first several months of his administration to come up with a new state
policy for this crisis. On May 20th, the cabinet signed off on a plan to dispatch a naval
squadron of four frigates to the Mediterranean under the Command of Commodore
Richard Dale. He ordered the Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith to command Dale to
actively blockade the Tripoli’s port and use his force “so as best to protect our
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commerce and chastise their insolence—by sinking, burning, or destroying their vessels
wherever you shall find them.”172
The ramifications of his command to sink, burn, or destroy the Bashaw’s corsairs
shows the transitional nature of Jefferson’s character. Jefferson’s command essentially
constituted an act of war. Furthermore, the president did not have the authority to
engage in foreign war without Congressional approval. Jefferson’s unilateral decision
illustrates his willingness to expand executive power in order to achieve his policy goals.
This constitutional issue came to light in December 1801, when American Captain
Andrew Sterrett engaged a Tripolitan naval ship and crippled it, killing over twenty of its
crew.173 Sterrett’s naval victory was an example of Jefferson’s willingness to put rhetoric
into action, at the same time, it also illustrated that Jefferson, not Congress, had taking
the nation to war.174 This powerful unilateral move contradicted Jefferson’s inaugural
promise to not enlarge the government or expand executive authority.175 However, in a
display of political savvy, Jefferson heralded Sterrett as a war hero to Congress and
asked Congress to retroactively approve of his military maneuvers. In “an Act for the
protection of the Commerce and the Seamen of the United States against Tripolitan
cruisers,” Congress legitimized Jefferson’s interventionist policy and empowered the
president to use the U.S. Navy at his complete discretion, allowing him access to U.S
treasury in order to build more ships.176
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In the larger scope of the war, the crippling of one small vessel hardly constituted
an American victory. Nevertheless, it did symbolize that the Jefferson administration
was serious about changing American policy in the Mediterranean. Although he had a
military success and Congress’ blessing, Jefferson was unwilling to aggressively
expand his interventionist agenda into an open and direct naval warfare against Tripoli.
In Jefferson’s eyes, force meant the projection of force, and therefore, Jefferson sought
a limited war against Tripoli that consisted of ineffective and porous blockades around
the Muslim regency.177 Jefferson saw himself as “the enemy to all douceurs, tributes,
and humiliations,” yet, his military strategy comprised of blockading the enemy’s ports
with the “smallest force competent.”178 The three years of ineffective blockade and the
weak projection of power compelled William Eaton, Consul of Tunis, to proclaim that
“the Government may as well send out Quaker meeting-houses” to serve as the
American Navy.179
Disaster, however, changed the course of the war, as it forced Jefferson to adopt
a more aggressive military and diplomatic strategy in order to achieve victory. The 1803
captured of the USS Philadelphia by Tripolitan corsairs fundamentally transformed the
nature of the war. Until this humiliating event, Jefferson felt no pressure to change his
naval policy of limited, cost effective, blockades with conducted with “the smallest force
competent.”180 However, with over three-hundred American citizens locked in the
Bashaw’s dungeons, the Philadelphia capture turned the war into a humanitarian crisis
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that demanded immediate resolution and policy change.181 These enslaved Americans
placed a unique pressure on Jefferson, as their imprisonment and uncertain fate forced
Jefferson to aggressively transform his approach to ending the war through force and
diplomacy. Thus, the Philadelphia disaster was a turning point for the trajectory of the
Barbary War, because it demanded from Jefferson a new style of executive leadership
that was unilateral, centralized, and decisive. Far from the limited war he envisioned in
1801, the post-Philadelphia Barbary War required a new commander in chief. As
emblematic of an ideology in transition, Jefferson’s new strategy to defeat Tripoli was to
harness the previously untapped power of the executive to achieve his foreign policy
goals.182
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, Jefferson reacted with both action and
policy. Three months after the Philadelphia’s capture, the U.S. Navy enacted its
revenge with a December 1804 covert raid to blow up the stolen vessel in the Tripolitan
harbor.183 Led by Lt. Steven Decatur, this unexpected attack sent shock waves across
the Atlantic, inspiring British Royal Navy giant Horacio Nelson to call Decatur’s raid “the
most bold and daring act of the age.”184 Unlike Captain Sterrett’s early success in 1801,
Jefferson did not let positive momentum go to waste. Now that Jefferson had a war hero
and the shot of optimism desperately needed to revive patriotism for the war effort, he
moved to enact expansionist policies designed to bring the fight to the enemy.185
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Jefferson rode this national optimism into military policy, demanded a naval
expansion unlike any other. In March 1804, when news of the successful raid arrived in
Washington, Secretary of State Robert Smith recorded Jefferson’s new strategic plan
for the Barbary War:

The President immediately determined to put in Commission and to
send to the Mediterranean a force which would be able beyond the
possibility of a doubt , to coerce the Enemy to a peace upon Terms
compatible with our Honor and our Interest. A due regard to our situation
with Tripoli and precautionary considerations in relation to the other
Barbary Powers, demanded our forces in that quarter should be so far
augmented as to leave no doubt of our compelling the existing Enemy to
submit to our own terms, and of effectually checking any hostile
disposition that might be entertained towards us by any of the other
Barbary Powers.186

Congress had passed Naval Bills in the past, but the piecemeal aspect of the
previous bills in 1802 and 1803 were never followed by a change in both overall military
strategy and North African diplomacy.187 In order to compel victory “without doubt,”
Congress passed a new bill to allocate an additional one million dollars to create five
new frigates.188 This fourth and final armada was led by Commodore Samuel Barron,
who set sail against Tripoli six frigates, five schooners, two bomb ships, and ten smaller
gun boats, two-hundred and sixty guns in all. Together, the cost of this final fleet
exceeded $1.5 million, over three times the amount spent on the naval force dispatched
in 1801.189 This enhanced and empowered squadron at last directly engaged Bashaw
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Karamanli’s forces off the coast of Tripoli on August 3rd, 1804.190 The ensuing naval
battles and American bombardment of Tripolitan naval fortresses represented a clear
change in U.S. strategy towards the enemy. Action and attack, not simply blockades,
now characterized the final year of the Barbary War.
Such a commitment to a projection and usage of force abroad was incredibly
expensive. During his 1801 inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson promised his
constituencies a “frugal government” that would not shall not take from the mouth of
labor the great it has earned.”191 Not wanting to directly tax American citizens as a
means to raise the $1.5 million needed to pay for Barron’s fleet, Jefferson sought to
enact tax revenue elsewhere. In what he called, “the Mediterranean Fund,” the
president placed a 2.5% “ad valorem” duty on imports.192 Although he did not resort to
taxing American citizens, this ambitious tax system nevertheless represented an
expansion of the bureaucratic state by a president committed to a small and nonintrusive government. Stressed by a crisis that demanded quick resolution, Jefferson
had to abandon portions of his ideology that prevented him from achieving his foreign
policy goals. In order to protect his nation’s right to free trade, Jefferson had to act like
his Federalist predecessors by enacting a national revenue system designed fund a
massive military expansion.
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The Philadelphia crisis did not just change Jefferson’s commitment to military
force, it compelled Jefferson to reconsider the diplomatic channels available to facilitate
peace. In addition to empowering his traditional foreign officers to act unilaterally in the
best interest of American peace, Jefferson also took advantage of non-traditional means
of diplomatic pressure.193 Since 1801, the Jefferson administration knew of an
opportunity to use the Bashaw’s brother, Hamet Karamanli, as a tool to overthrow the
existing hostile Bashaw government in Tripoli.194 Consul Eaton, who became the lead
proponent of the coup plan, regularly wrote to Secretary of State James Madison
through the years 1801-1803 arguing that an operation to restore the “rightful Bashaw”
would “have saved the United States more than a million of dollars and many lives.”195
In Eaton’s opinion, this was an “event which promises to a vast saving and perpetual
peace to the U. States.”196 Eaton’s argument fell on deft ears for two years, until the
Philadelphia’s inglorious capture forced Jefferson to reconsider the feasibility to this
clandestine plan to overthrow Tripoli’s government.197
It was not until Jefferson was faced with a time sensitive hostage crisis that he
was willing to take the extreme executive privilege to initiate a covert coup attempt
against the Bashaw. In doing so, Jefferson set significant precedent of American
presidents using force to create a pro-American regime change in a Middle Eastern
country. Two years earlier, the Jefferson administration was unwilling to involve itself
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with the internal affairs of a foreign ruler. However, after 1803, Jefferson and Madison
gave a tacit green-light to revolutionize Tripolitan politics. Writing to Consul General
Tobias Lear in 1804, Madison wrote “of the co-operation of the Elder brother of the
Bashaw of Tripoli we are still willing to avail ourselves, if the Commodore [Barron]
should Judge that it may be useful.” In addition, Lear was ordered to work with Eaton in
North Africa “in all such measures as may be deemed the best calculated to effectuate
a termination” of the war.198 This direction corresponded with Eaton being named
“Agent of the Navy for the Barbary Regencies,” and he was transported by the navy to
Alexandria in order to find Hamet and commence the mission. In order to finance the
operation, Barron was authorized to give Eaton $20,000 as a means to pay for men and
supplies.199
Although Jefferson never outright stated his approval, his government’s support
was clear in its support, as evident in the formal title bestowed on Eaton (Eaton called
himself “General Eaton”), the $20,000 to finance the mission, and in the navy transport
that delivered him to Hamet. In a pact signed on February 23, 1805, Eaton pledged that
he, and his U.S. forces (Eaton was given eight Marines and two sailors), would use “the
utmost exertions, so far as comports with their own honor and interest” to instill Hamet
as the rightful Bashaw of Tripoli. This pact was forwarded to Madison but never ratified
by the Senate. Nevertheless, on March 8, Eaton began his mission understanding that
he had the support of his government, and thus he commenced the five-hundred mile
journey to Tripoli from Alexandria with Hamet and five-hundred Greek, Arab, and Berber
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mercenaries in tow.200 Acting like an early 19th century Lawrence of Arabia, General
Eaton marched his motely force across the North African desert to assault the strategic
seaborne city of Derna, and after arduous six-week journey, on April 28, 1805, Eaton,
supported by three American naval gunboats, attacked and secured the surrender of
the city.201 After a two-hour battle, Eaton raised, for the first time, an American flag over
a defeated enemy in a foreign land. Victory, however, proved bittersweet. Two months
later as Eaton and Hamet were planning their attack on the Tripolitan capital, Lear and
Bashaw Karamanli signed a peace treaty, officially ending the First Barbary
War.202American peace, however, offered no provision for the so-called “rightful”
Bashaw, as Eaton was ordered to return home and abandon Derna, leaving Hamet
Karamanli stranded in his brother’s hostile land.203

*

*

*

*

*

Although peace had been reached in 1805, it was neither permanent nor
popular.204 Yes the United States had bombarded Yusuf into the negotiation table, but
the Bashaw still held his trump card, the three-hundred American souls locked away in
his dungeons. In order to secure a peace that alleviated the hostage crisis, Tobias Lear
agreed for the United States government to pay $60,000 in order to secure the safe
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release of America’s imprisoned sailors.205 Thus, the Bashaw, even in defeat, was able
to extract one more lump sum payment from a U.S. president who swore never to be a
tribute to a Barbary Power. Upon hearing that Lear signed such a forgiving peace and
ransom, Eaton seethed that “both honor and humanity bleeds” because of this
humiliating treaty. However, Eaton aimed his fury and sense of betrayal most directly at
President Jefferson. Calling Jefferson a “coward” and a “fraud in a mask,” Eaton raged
that "Mr. Jefferson began his administration under the most promising auspices and the
assurances he gave his country on the faith of his plighted power . . . he had discharged
his promises to refine deceptions, frauds, and speculations on public confidence and
incorrigible errors has strongly marked every stage of his prudential conduct."206
Eaton, however, missed the point. His strong criticism of Jefferson’s willingness
to agree to an unfavorable peace speak to the personal attachment he felt to towards
the important role he played in the conflict. However, this personal connection blinded
his ability to view the wider trajectory of the war, and therefore, Eaton was unable to see
how Jefferson’s war aims had transformed since 1801. At the start of the war, Jefferson
was an outspoken proponent of a permanent peace secured through force. However, as
soon as the Philadelphia disaster turned the war into a hostage crisis, Jefferson
changed his strategy from a safe and economical tactic of blockade to a more direct and
immediate strategy aimed at establishing a quick resolution to both America’s tribute
system and hostage situation.207
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The four years it took to find resolution in the Frist Barbary War illustrated the
complexity embedded into Thomas Jefferson’s character as America’s President and
Commander in Chief. Although he had a clear idea of the outcome he had in mind, the
means of achieving that successful military outcome was far from consistent or well
defined. This strategic unevenness points to the larger picture seen in Jefferson’s war
leadership, that Jefferson’s ideology experienced a point of transition. When his rhetoric
of force came up against the realities of war, Jefferson adapted. A study of Jefferson’s
decision making during the war reveals an ideological pragmatism that allowed him to
maintain his overall goal of protecting free trade, while at the same time, adapting his
principles to the changing demands of war.208 Seen in this light, the Barbary War
against Tripoli created a moment in which Jefferson had to act against principles held
since his early political career. This war was far from the only episode in Jefferson’s life
to challenge is Republicanism, however, it was a significant in the precedent it set for
future American leaders.209 In order to achieve his personal policy goals, harnessed the
power of the national government in unpreceded ways. In doing so, Jefferson expanded
his role of Commander in Chief like no other Federalist president before him. In the last
two years of the war, Jefferson built the navy to unprecedented power at great expense,
grew the federal government’s taxation network, and supported a plan to revolutionize a
foreign government through a secret military coup. The First Barbary War from 1801 to
1805 may now only be remembered as a line in the Marine Corps Hymn, but the
ramifications it had on the presidency of Thomas Jefferson were transformative. Serving
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as the United States’ first wartime Commander in Chief, Jefferson helped to define the
role for his future successors, and in doing so, expanded the role to new levels of
executive power.
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